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Safety Net 
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grams for Conservation 
and Bioenergy 
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1The 2007 Farm Bill: Drivers of the Debate
Bradley D. Lubben
Extension Public Policy Specialist
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Samuel M. Funk
Agricultural Policy Specialist
Kansas State University
Troy J. Dumler
Extension Agricultural Economist
Kansas State University
The debate on the 2007 Farm Bill has begun in earnest in Washington. The new Congress has already
convened several hearings on farm policy issues, including energy and conservation. The Administration
has just released its policy recommendations for the new farm bill, opening up further discussion that will
grow over the coming months. The current farm bill, passed in 2002, runs through September 2007 and
includes programs covering the 2007-2008 crop year. Before it expires, Congress will need to reconcile
the current discussion and debate and either pass a new farm bill or an extension of the current one.
While the discussion and development of the new farm bill will be played out over the coming months, it is
important to remember several fundamental factors that drive the debate. Drawing from an old adage,
“farm bills are always a product of their times.” While the exact setting changes from farm bill to farm bill,
the same key factors continue to drive the debate. The economic setting, the budget setting, the trade
arena, and the political climate all influence the development of each farm bill. Understanding each of
these drivers is a fundamental part of understanding the potential new farm bill.
Economics
The economic setting heading into the
2007 Farm Bill is clearly different than it
was in 2001 when the 2002 Farm Bill
was developed. In the four years
leading up to the 2002 Farm Bill, U.S.
net farm income less government
payments averaged just over $30 billion
(see Figure 1) and was supplemented
with nearly $20 billion annually in
government payments, including
emergency assistance from Congress.
The 2002 Farm Bill debate focused in
part on the size of the farm income
safety net and the calls to formalize the
emergency assistance into a basic part
of the safety net. At the time, the
counter-cyclical payment program was
advertised as exactly that.
In early 2007, the economic setting is very different. Coming off of record farm income levels in 2004 and
2005 above $70 billion (see Figure 1), farm income levels moderated in 2006 to $61 billion. There have
also been concerns about higher energy costs taking several billion dollars additional dollars out of net
farm income. But, the higher energy prices have also supported the rapidly-developing biofuels industry,
creating new demand for agricultural commodities, particularly corn. The resultant increase in the price of
corn and other commodities has sparked a surge in crop profitability and the first forecast of 2007 net farm
income just released from USDA projects a rebound in U.S. net farm income to nearly $67 billion. If the
projections hold, the 2004-2007 period will represent the strongest U.S farm income performance on
record (in nominal terms). While government payments continue to be a significant share of farm income
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2at an estimated $16.5 billion annually over the same time period, the strength of the farm economy
changes the debate from one about the size of the safety net to one about the shape of the safety net.
Already, the current higher grain price and economic outlook for the U.S. agricultural sector has variously
led to calls 1) to end farm income support programs as unnecessary, 2) to strengthen programs and raise
the level of the safety net under current higher prices, 3) to shift the program from one based on prices to
one based on revenue, or 4) to simply extend the current safety net as a cost-saving option in light of other
concerns in the budget and trade arena.
Budget
The budget setting is also very different
now than it was in 2001. In 2001, the
debate was about how to allocate an
additional $70 billion in baseline
spending for agriculture out of a
growing federal budget surplus. Since
then, the focus has shifted to the size
of the federal budget deficit (see Figure
2) and the possible spending cuts to
reduce the deficit. The deficit of $248
billion in fiscal year 2006 (matched up
in the graph as the lead-in year of the
2007 Farm Bill debate) is the largest
ever amidst a farm bill debate.
In this budget climate, the President
has proposed agricultural spending cuts in each of his past three budget requests, including the fiscal year
2008 budget request just released in early February. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 did make several
cuts in farm program spending, including cuts to conservation, rural development, and research and
delayed part of the direct (fixed) payments to producers.
While these initial cuts signal continued pressure on farm program spending, there are several caveats to
temper the budget concerns. First, farm bills almost always have been debated in times of federal budget
deficits. Only two farm bills in the last 40-plus years (1970 and 2002) were debated in the presence of a
budget surplus. In addition, the current deficit represents only 1.9 percent of the nation’s GDP (right axis in
graph in Figure 2) and is much lower in real terms (constant dollars) than the deficit at the time of most
farm bill debates since the mid-1970s.
Another point of emphasis is that current farm programs are actually costing less than expected. Due to
higher crop prices and future price projections, spending on farm commodity programs is several billion
below original budgeted levels. In the new baseline budget estimates released in January by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 10-year spending projections for mandatory farm support programs
are $35 billion less than the 10-year projections issued in January 2006. This reduced spending does not
technically count as savings to be allocated elsewhere, but it does change the political climate in which
federal budget decisions will be made.
These budget decisions will in fact represent the first test of future policy directions. While the agricultural
committees have jurisdiction over the authorization of new farm bill, the budget committees will determine
the dollar limit to put on that authority. The baseline spending projections in March 2007 will represent the
starting point for discussions. While the higher prices and reduced spending projections may suggest the
possibility of additional baseline allocations for agriculture, Congress must also deal with the “Pay-As-You-
Go” (PAYGO) budget rule adopted in the U.S. House of Representatives. These rules stipulate that any
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3bill that offers provisions increasing spending from CBO budget baseline estimates be offset by spending
cuts (or tax increases) in other provisions.
The budget setting presents a difficult outlook for programs looking for increased funding in the 2007 Farm
Bill. The deficit and the PAYGO rules both suggest a difficult challenge for any proposed increases in
baseline funding for new or existing programs. At the same time, the reduced baseline projections for
spending under the commodity programs means the overall size of the farm program pie could be smaller
than most groups expected, leaving less opportunity for political and budget tradeoffs of one program for
another.
Trade
The trade setting is dominated at present by two key questions. Will the WTO Doha Round negotiations
break out of its current stalemate and move toward an agreement? Will the U.S. be subjected to repeated
challenges of its farm programs under the conflict resolution process of the existing trade agreement?
Both of these questions may point toward necessary reforms in U.S. farm programs. 
The WTO Doha Round negotiations have been a slow, complex process since they officially began in
2001. In a framework agreement in July 2004, WTO member nations agreed to do three things in regard
to agriculture: 1) increase market access (i.e. reduce tariffs and barriers that discourage imports), 2)
reduce trade-distorting domestic subsidies, and 3) eliminate export subsidies. The difficulty in reaching
agreement revolves around how these framework objectives are to be met. How much will tariffs and
domestic subsidies be reduced? What is the time frame for these reductions? The goal was to work these
details out at a WTO summit in Hong Kong in December 2005. When that meeting failed to reach
consensus, the talks stretched into 2006 and continued until July, when the WTO Director-General Pascal
Lamy suspended the negotiations, calling for a period of “time-out” to allow WTO members to reassess
their negotiating positions.
Table 1. World Trade Organization Negotiations and Agricultural Issues Post Hong Kong.
Export Competition Domestic Supports Market Access
(direct subsidies on exports) (domestic subsidies with effects
on production and trade)
(domestic barriers restricting
imports)
Agreement to phase out export
subsidies by 2013
-includes direct export subsidies
-includes subsidy portions of
export credit programs
Agreement to eliminate cotton
export subsidies in 2006
Disciplines on food assistance
and establishment of “safe box”
for bona fide food aid
Reduction of aggregate
measures of support (AMS)
across three bands (“Amber
Box” and “Blue Box” programs)
-higher cuts for higher bands of
current spending
-Europe likely in highest band
-Japan and U.S. likely in second
band
-Bands, cuts, and schedule for
cuts not yet developed
No disciplines discussed on
“Green Box” programs
Elimination of 97 percent of
existing tariff lines on imported
products from least-developed
countries
Reduction in tariff rates across
four bands
-higher cuts for higher bands of
current tariff rates
Flexible terms for “sensitive”
products
-limited number of “sensitive
products” not confirmed
4Since July 2006, informal discussions have continued at various venues, but to date, no breakthrough
compromise agreements have been announced. While the U.S. Trade Representatives have offered
proposals to reduce trade-distorting domestic farm program payments to secure progress from the
European Union (EU) and other in opening markets, the EU and numerous developing countries have
insisted that the United States must improve its offer to reduce domestic subsidies before they will
increase market access. At the same time, various U.S. policymakers and interest groups have argued
that it is the EU and the other counties that need to make a better offer of market access in the WTO.
While the WTO negotiations could continue almost indefinitely with little progress, the calendar does
present two issues in the United States to prod the negotiations forward. The first is the President’s trade
promotion authority (TPA). This authority to negotiate trade agreements that are subject to ratification by
Congress without amendment expires in July 2007. If TPA expires and is not renewed, as seems likely in
the current Congress, then the President’s ability to negotiate any trade agreement is severely restricted.
TPA requires any trade agreement to be voted on as is without amendments. Not having TPA would mean
Congress might add several amendments to the implementation of any WTO agreement, essentially
scuttling the agreement as written and eliminating the President’s ability to negotiate in good faith.
The above discussion notes that a WTO agreement could demand changes in U.S. farm programs. At the
same time, the failure of a WTO agreement could also lead to changes in U.S. farm programs. The United
States has already been found in violation of WTO rules as agreed to in the previous round of trade
negotiations, the “Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.” Under that agreement the United States and
other countries subsidizing agriculture made commitments on reducing the amount of subsidies and
limiting the total spending on trade-distorting programs. Based on the rules of that agreement, Brazil filed
suit against the United States in the WTO, claiming that total subsidies on U.S. cotton exceeded the
allowed limits set forth in the Uruguay Round. The WTO found in favor of Brazil and ruled that the United
States must change certain cotton programs, or face retaliatory damages of several billion dollars.
There are some important implications of the Brazilian cotton case for U.S. farm programs. First, it was
determined by the WTO that the U.S. direct payment program is not a “green box” (minimally trade
distorting and unlimited) program. Rather, it is an “amber box” (trade distorting and limited) program that
has more significant trade distorting aspects because of a restriction on planting fruits and vegetables on
contract acres receiving a direct payment. This issue will have to be addressed by Congress should they
determine it important to make direct payments a “green box” program.
Second, the United States has thus far made some policy changes for cotton, including the elimination of
the Step 2 program and the elimination of violating portions of the export credit programs. But, the United
States has not made any adjustments to the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment programs also
found to be in violation of support limits. As a result, Brazil has filed a follow-up complaint arguing that the
United States has only partially implemented policy changes required to comply with the ruling and
demanding either compliance or the right to enact retaliatory measures. Congress will have to address
these issues as well within the scope of the farm bill deliberations.
Third, the model of the Brazilian cotton case can be readily translated to other program commodities,
given the same set of farm policy tools. At the moment, Canada has initiated consultations with the WTO
in complaint of U.S. corn subsidies, with several other countries joining the consultations. If a new WTO
agreement is not achieved, these disputes and others could become more commonplace and result in
piecemeal challenges and changes in U.S. farm programs over time.
Between the trade negotiations on a new agreement that would demand farm spending reforms and the
potential piecemeal changes that could occur in response to WTO complaints in the absence of a new
agreement, it appears that changes are coming. However, the changes do not necessarily dictate the end
of farm programs. They simply demand at least some shift to programs that are more acceptable in the
trade arena.
5Politics
Finally, one cannot prepare for the next farm bill debate without noting the role of politics. An often-used
saying is that “politics always trumps economics” and that is certainly true with the farm bill. Although the
economics of farm income, federal budgets, and trade agreements will certainly push some of the debate,
the farm bill will eventually largely be a product of the political environment in which it is created. And that
environment has changed substantially since the last farm bill was completed in 2002.
With the November 2006 elections, Democrats regained control of both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, meaning new committee chairs assumed leadership in January, just in time to develop
the new farm bill. The shift from two Republican committee chairs to two Democratic committee chairs
may bring with it a larger focus on certain specific policy issues such as the Conservation Security
Program and the role of payment limits, two issues that have the interest of Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa,
the new Senate agricultural committee chair.
However, it is worth remembering another old saying that “farm bills are generally more parochial than
they are partisan.” With Representative Collin Peterson leading the House agriculture committee, the new
Congress has two agriculture committee chairs from the Upper Midwest whereas the previous Congress
had two chairs from the South. Regional differences in farm program spending, basic commodity issues,
and conservation targets could lead to challenging committee work that is more split along regional lines
than political lines.
While the formal change in Congress is significant, it is also important to recognize the emerging presence
of several farm bill interest groups outside the traditional farm, commodity, and agribusiness sector. For
more than 30 years, the development of each farm bill has been a comprehensive, coalition-supported
process. And yet, the traditional groups within production agriculture clearly played the role of lead partner.
Increasingly, that model has been challenged by other interest groups.
Conservation programs have grown substantially in recent years. In fact, the 2002 Farm Bill has been
widely reported as the “greenest” farm bill to date, with nearly $3 billion in annual conservation program
spending for programs like the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP), and the new Conservation Security Program (CSP). And yet, conservation
spending has also been a regular target for Congress when spending cuts have been required to offset
disaster payments or satisfy budget reconciliation requirements.
Conservation and environmental groups have placed an increased emphasis on securing additional
funding for conservation programs. One group, the Environmental Working Group, utilized the public
availability of program payment data and published a widely-referenced database of government
payments. This database has substantially shifted the debate over conservation spending from “How
much money for conservation?” to “Why so much money for commodities?”
Similar strategies are appearing in other special interest areas as well. Food nutrition and assistance
groups have historically been the “urban” partner to the “rural” production agriculture sector in building
political support for a comprehensive farm bill. But, groups in this area are looking more to their own
programs, questioning why the United States is subsidizing the production of food and feed grains and not
“more nutritious” fruits and vegetables. And in the rural development area, groups are looking at the role of
bioenergy as a new driver of economic activity across the rural United States.
While the other interests groups have been honing their message and increasing their efforts, the farm,
commodity, and agribusiness interests are still central to the debate. The political battle has largely been
played out thus far as other interests fighting for a larger piece of the total farm bill spending pie, each
hoping to take some of the current share going to traditional commodity programs. With the early
expectations of cuts for trade or budget reasons, coupled with potential savings from payment limit
changes, there were hopes for substantial funds to be freed up for other programs.
6However, there are some limits to that political strategy. First, as noted in the budget setting, the current
projections for higher prices mean the baseline spending projections for existing commodity programs are
down substantially. This simultaneously means that there is less baseline to potentially reallocate to other
programs and that maintaining the existing commodity programs is suddenly more feasible in terms of
both trade and budget constraints. Another political factor to consider is that the farm commodity programs
remain a core part of the farm bill. If the core agricultural interests are diminished in the farm bill process,
the overall driving force to pass a farm bill could be diminished as well. Shifting the major focus of the farm
bill away from production agriculture could just as easily lead to no farm bill and no major reauthorization
as it could to an increased role for the other program areas. 
Conclusion
Reflecting on the four factors driving the debate - economics, budget, trade, politics - the farm bill
development will continue to be a complex and challenging process. The various competing interests have
yet to battle over budget allocations and only then will they be able to fully engage in the battle over
program alternatives. The real farm bill debate is only now getting started, with Congressional hearings
underway and the Secretary’s farm bill recommendations now out. Congress has already hosted the
Secretary for testimony on the Administration’s farm bill recommendations and will likely convene several
more hearings to receive testimony and recommendations. Then Congress will begin the work of
developing farm bill language in the agricultural committees and moving it toward final passage.
Discussions in committee and on the floor of Congress could well last through the summer of 2007 or
beyond, making for an interesting several months ahead.
Historical Rationale for Farm Programs 
 
Troy J. Dumler 
Extension Agricultural Economist 
K-State Research and Extension 
 
 
Supporters of U.S. farm programs offer many justifications for the current and future use 
of farm programs. The most common of these justifications include: saving the family 
farm, supporting rural communities, providing a cheap food supply, maintaining the 
environment, and competing with large agribusinesses and subsidizing countries. A 
recent survey on preferences for the 2007 Farm Bill indicates that U.S. producers still 
value these justifications for farm subsidies (Farm Foundation). Oftentimes these 
justifications are cited by supporters and treated as fact. But are they fact? Following is a 
discussion of the primary historical arguments for farm subsidies. 
 
Saving the Family Farm   
 
The rational for saving the family farm through farm subsidies is both emotional and 
economic. The emotional aspect has its roots in the founding of the United States. At the 
time of its independence from Great Britain, the United States was essentially a nation of 
farmers. Prominent founding fathers like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were 
farmers themselves. Jefferson’s vision for the United States, later termed the Jeffersonian 
democracy, was “a nation of landowning farmers living under as little government as 
possible.” (Worldbook.com) As the nation expanded westward, so did agriculture—
fulfilling Jefferson’s vision, at least in part.      
 
The image of a nation of small farmers still resonates. Certainly, small farm advocacy 
groups promote such a system. The fact that 42% of the 2.1 million farms in the U.S. are 
residential or lifestyle farms (Hoppe and Banker, p.11), indicates that many people still 
value aspects of the agricultural lifestyle. Likewise, the fact that U.S. taxpayers have been 
willing to subsidize farmers at an average rate of $17 billion over the last 10 years 
(USDA-ERS, 2006a) suggests that they, at least to a certain extent, value Jefferson’s 
vision as well. 
 
Farm and Non-farm Household Income 
 
Current farm subsidies originated in Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal legislative package 
in 1933. At that time, average farm household income was about half of that of non-farm 
households (Jones, et al.). Also, in 1930, 21.5% of the U.S. workforce was employed in 
production agriculture that contributed 7.7% of the total U.S. GDP. With a large 
workforce earning income half that of their non-farm counterparts, the federal 
government felt compelled to provide assistance to farmers in the form of price supports 
and supply management.  
 
Today, the situation in agriculture is much different. In 2000, only 1.9% of the U.S. 
workforce was employed in production agriculture, and agriculture contributed only 0.7% 
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of U.S. GDP in 2002 (Dimitri, et al.). Moreover, farm households now routinely earn 
more than non-farm households. Figure 1 shows farm and non-farm household income in 
the U.S. from 1960-2004. After reaching a level basically on par with non-farm income 
in the 1960s, farm household income was 33% higher than non-farm income in 2004 
(Jones, et al). Based on these numbers alone, it would be hard to justify subsidizing farms 
on the basis of disparities in income as was originally the case when farm programs were 
first instituted in 1933. 
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Supporters of farm subsidies may make the argument that farm income would not be 
greater than or equal to non-farm income without subsidies. If one considers that 
government payments contributed 30.6% of net farm income from 2000-06 (USDA-ERS, 
2006a), that argument would seem to have some merit. However, one must also 
remember that not all government payments go to farmers. Since commodity program 
payments are tied to land, landowners benefit as well.    
 
Farm subsidy proponents will also often point out that the majority of farm household 
income comes from non-farm sources. That is certainly true when household income is 
averaged across all farms. However, when broken out by USDA farm typology class, not 
all farms receive the majority of household income from non-farm sources. Table 1 
shows household income from farm and non-farm sources by USDA farm typology 
group in 2004. Rural residence farms, which include limited-resource, 
residential/lifestyle, and retirement farms, had an average household annual income of 
$75,316. Non-farm sources were responsible for 100% of total household income for 
these farms. Because 42% of all farms are residential/lifestyle farms, which claim a 
primary occupation other than farming, it is not surprising that the average farm would 
earn a high percentage of household income from non-farm sources. But as table 1 also 
indicates, commercial farms (i.e., farms with sales over $250,000) earn over 75% of 
household income from farm sources. Basically this leads to the warning that people 
should be careful not to draw too strong of conclusions when comparing farm household 
income to non-farm household income. 
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Table 1. Household Income from Farm and Non-farm Sources by USDA Farm Typology. 
Farm 
Typology 
Group 
No. of 
Farms 
Total Farm 
Household 
Income
Income from 
Farm Sources
Income from 
Non-farm 
Sources 
% from 
Farm 
Sources
Rural 
Residence 1,373,956 $75,316 $-76 $75,391 -0.1
Intermediate 529,071 $64,789 $12,240 $52,549 18.9
Commercial 157,795 $191,115 $145,080 $46,035 75.9
All 2,060,822 $81,480 $14,201 $67,279 17.4
 Source: USDA-ERS, Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2004. 
 
Equity of Farm Income Support 
 
While the goal of saving the family farm may be noble from a social standpoint, there are 
questions as to whether the current farm income support programs are meeting that 
objective from an economic standpoint. These questions revolve around two primary 
issues. First, are government payments distributed equitably across the farm sector? 
Second, is profitability enhanced for farms that receive government payments?  
 
According to data from USDA, only 39% of U.S. farms received government payments 
in 2003 (Hoppe and Banker, p. 25). Of those farms that received farm subsidies, 66% of 
total payments went to five commodities: corn, cotton, wheat, soybeans, and rice (USDA, 
CCC Net Outlays by Commodity and Function). Because medium, large and very large 
farms (those farms with annual sales greater than $100,000) have a higher percentage of 
farms that specialize in cash grains and other field crops that receive subsidies, they 
receive a higher percentage of payments (figure 2). This, in turn leads to criticisms that 
“large farms get all the payments”. However, the fact that large commercial farms receive 
the bulk of government payments has less to do with large farms abusing subsidy 
programs to the detriment of small farms (as some try to make the case), than it does with 
the structure of the farm programs themselves. If the goal of U.S. farm income support is 
to save the family farm, and between 35 to 41 percent of small farms (limited-resource, 
Share of farms, value of production, and government 
payments by farm typology group, 2003
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retirement, residential/lifestyle, and farming-occupation/low sales farms) produce beef, 
should beef producers not receive income supports as well? Given the current structure of 
farm programs and the equity issue created from tying farm program payments to specific 
commodities, the argument that farm subsidies help save the family farm is debatable.  
 
Nevertheless, government payments have contributed a significant portion of net farm 
income over the last two and one half decades (figure 3). But as previously mentioned, 
not all the benefits of government payments go to farmers, as a portion of those benefits 
gets capitalized into land values. This reality has two ramifications. First, it demonstrates 
that family farms are not the only beneficiaries of farm subsidies. Second, it indicates that 
as farm income would decline from a reduction or elimination of government payments, 
farm asset and equity values would also decline.  
 
A study by Kastens and Dhuyvetter estimated that average cropland values by state 
would fall by 2.3% to 40.8% if government payments were eliminated.  Certainly, a 
reduction in land values of that magnitude could have a devastating effect on the financial 
viability of many farms.  The estimated decline in land values, however, assumes that 
100% of government payments are capitalized into land.  In reality, government 
payments are not likely to be fully capitalized into land values.  
 
The greatest challenge facing most commercial farms in the U.S. is variability of income. 
Figure 3 shows U.S. aggregate net farm income (NFI) and direct government payments 
from 1997-2006. Over that timeframe, NFI averaged $57.2 billion per year, with a range 
from $40.2 billion in 2002 to $85.4 billion in 2004. Government payments, as previously 
noted average $17 billion during those same years, accounting for 31% of NFI. Certainly, 
farm income is variable and government payments have contributed a significant share of 
income over the last 10 years. However, the aggregate U.S. data actually mask income 
variability and the importance of government payments associated with some regions and 
commodities. Even though not all farms will become unprofitable if government 
payments are eliminated, it is also important to realize that in some years, in some 
regions, government payments contribute a large portion of NFI. Undoubtedly, an 
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immediate elimination of farm programs would have severe consequences for farmers 
and rural communities historically dependant on those programs. How farms manage the 
variability of income, especially if farm programs were to be reduced or eliminated, will 
be a big factor in determining the long-term success of a farm. Because the U.S. has 
chosen to help some farmers manage risk through farm supports does not imply that there 
are not other means to manage financial risk.      
 
Supporting Rural Communities  
 
Oftentimes the words “farm” and “rural” are used interchangeably. In the past, such use 
may have been reasonable. Today, however, that likely will not be accurate. According to 
information in USDA’s 2007 Farm Bill Theme Paper on Rural Development, “less than 
10 percent of rural people currently live on a farm and only 6.5 percent of the rural 
workforce is directly employed in farm production.” That compares to 40 % of the rural 
population living on farms, with 33 percent of the rural workforce directly employed in 
agriculture in 1950. Although only 10% of the rural population currently lives on farms, 
20% of rural counties are classified as farm-dependant (greater than 20% of county 
personal earnings come from farming). Of those counties, 78% had a population loss 
from 2000-2005. The poor economic performance of these farm-dependant counties and 
subsequent population losses have led to subsidies being viewed as a remedy for rural 
America.  
   
By supporting farm income through farm programs, proponents of farm subsidies argue 
that these programs help save rural communities as well. The logic of this argument is 
straightforward. If farmers make more money, that money will then be spent in the 
community—stimulating economic growth. In other words, if farmers are doing well, 
then rural communities will do well. If one follows the logical progression of this 
argument then one would expect rural communities that receive high amounts of farm 
subsidies to perform well economically. However, a recent study by the Center for the 
Study of Rural America of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City suggests that such 
an argument may not hold. Instead of growing, U.S. counties that were most dependent 
on farm payments relative to the local economy actually experienced job and population 
growth rates lower than counties less dependent on payments. As the article points out 
though, it is possible that economic performance would have been even worse without 
the payments. 
 
The question that naturally comes to mind when seeing such results is: Why do most 
counties that are most dependent on farm payments perform worse than other rural 
counties? There are several possible explanations. First, the government payments 
themselves may have a negative impact. Programs such as the marketing loan program 
encourage production above market clearing levels. That, in turn, keeps prices lower than 
they would otherwise be without the loan program. In such a scenario, the low cost 
producer will be most profitable. Moreover, low cost producers have advantages over 
their high cost counterparts in lowering costs. Low cost producers can afford to outbid 
other producers in acquiring land, which enables them to get larger and spread fixed 
assets such as machinery over more output. This process encourages farms to get larger 
in order to be profitable. Since there is a limited amount of farmland available, not all 
 6
farms can expand to remain profitable. Consequently, farms go out of business and the 
economic viability of communities suffers.  
 
A paper by McGranahan and Beale offers some other possible explanations for rural 
population loss. Although poverty rates declined in 85% of rural counties in the 1990s, 
many farm-dependent counties continued to experience population loss. However, it is 
not necessarily the economic viability of agriculture in farm-dependent counties that is 
causing population loss. As McGranahan and Beale state:  
 
“what distinguishes farm-dependent counties from other rural counties is less the 
presence of farming than the absence of nonfarm activities. Farm-dependent 
counties are more likely to be remote from metro areas, to have low population 
density, and to lack natural amenities. These characteristics, which discourage 
other types of development, account for much of the population loss in farm-
dependent counties.”    
 
Because rural residence and intermediate family farms are dependent on nonfarm income 
(table 2), Browne, et al. suggest in Sacred Cows and Hot Potatoes (p. 35) that rural 
communities may be better served by “programs which facilitate the development of rural 
nonfarm economies.” In other words, if the goal is to strengthen the economic viability of 
rural communities in the U.S., that goal may be more efficiently accomplished by 
devoting resources to nonfarm endeavors than continuing to rely on commodity programs 
to drive economic activity in rural communities. 
 
Cheap Food Supply 
 
One of the most popular justifications farm subsidy advocates offer for the need to 
continue to subsidize agriculture is that U.S. consumers spend less on food than any other 
nation. Since peaking at a high of 25.2% in 1933, figure 4 shows the percentage of 
disposable personal income spent on food in the U.S. has steadily dropped to 9.5% in 
2004 (USDA-ERS, 2006b). Over that period of time, real disposable personal income has 
experienced a 14.3 fold increase while the amount of money spent on food has increased 
only 4.7 times. When compared to other countries in terms of the amount of money spent 
on food as a percentage of all household expenditures, U.S. consumers easily spend the 
lowest amount (table 2). Although U.S. consumers spend a smaller share of all household 
expenditures on food, it must be noted that total household expenditures are significantly 
higher in the U.S. than the other countries listed in table 2.  
 
Are farm subsidies responsible for the fact that U.S. consumers spend relatively less on 
food than other countries? A recent paper addresses that question. Miller and Coble 
evaluated the impact that U.S. farm subsidies had on the proportion of disposable income 
spent on food. The study concluded that from 1960-1999, government payments to 
farmers were not statistically significant in determining the percentage of disposable 
income spent of food. Rather, disposable income, productivity, and the farm-to-retail 
spread of food commodities had a statistically significant impact on the proportion of 
disposable income spent on food. 
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Table 2. Share of Household Final Consumption Expenditures Spent on Food by Selected 
Countries, 2002. 
Household Consumption Expenditures Country Food Share of Household 
Expenditures (%) Total ($) Food ($) 
United States 6.9 25,590 1,775 
United Kingdom 9.1 16,867 1,543 
Canada 9.9 12,715 1,264 
Germany 11.9 13,663 1,624 
Japan 14.4 17,456 2,517 
France 14.8 13,106 1,939 
Mexico 24.5 4,394 1,075 
India 39.7 313 124 
Philippines 47.5 667 317 
 Source: USDA-ERS, 2005. 
 
The argument that farm subsidies provide a cheap food supply to U.S. consumers does 
not withstand scrutiny. The argument is especially misplaced with commodities such as 
milk and sugar that are beneficiaries of price supports and supply controls that keep the 
prices U.S. consumers pay above world equilibrium prices. Such policies are especially 
burdensome on the poor, who spend a higher portion of their disposable income on food. 
 
Maintain the Environment 
 
Another popular justification for farm programs in general is that they help farmers 
maintain the environment. The argument made by farm program supporters is that in 
agricultural production, there are costs in terms of environmental degradation that are not 
covered by the market. Consequently, government policies are needed to compensate 
farmers for environmental practices that are not supported by the market. Environmental 
degradation in agricultural production can take place in two forms. The first type is 
environmental loss that occurs exclusively on the land being farmed. An example of this 
form of loss would be cropland that diminishes in productivity due to soil erosion. In 
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such a situation, the relevant question is, Do the costs of maintaining the soil outweigh 
the benefits to the farmer? If the costs are higher than the benefits, then the argument 
could be made that society may be well served by implementing policies that would 
encourage soil conservation practices (through subsidies, incentives, and/or regulations). 
However, even in this case, as long as land is transferable, there is a market incentive for 
the farmer to maintain the soil. If the market benefits from soil conservation outweigh the 
costs, then there are sufficient incentives for farmers to adopt conservation practices, 
without government intervention. 
 
The second form of environmental loss is externalities that affect not the farmer, but 
others. Examples of externalities from agricultural production include soil sediments in 
rivers and other bodies of water, contamination of groundwater from chemicals and 
fertilizers, blowing dust, and odors from confined livestock operations. Unlike 
environmental losses exclusive to the farmer, the market may not address these external 
costs. Once again, if that is the case, then society may benefit from government 
intervention.  
 
If government intervention is deemed appropriate for reducing externalities in 
agriculture, the next logical question is, What type of program(s) is best suited to 
accomplish that goal? Supporters of income support programs may argue that these 
programs would help provide market incentives for conservation practices. Certainly, 
income support programs may provide increased income, but they also result in higher 
costs in terms of land rents. Therefore, whether income support programs provide 
sufficient incentives for farmers to implement conservation practices is debatable.  
 
There is little debate, however, that income support programs can result in some 
unintended environmental consequences. Notably, income supports such as marketing 
loans, counter-cyclical payments, and direct payments provide incentives for farmers to 
produce crops on environmentally sensitive (and likely less profitable) land that 
otherwise may not be cropped. Likewise, these programs encourage the use of fertilizers 
and chemicals above market equilibrium levels. Excessive use of fertilizers and 
chemicals can have significant negative environment consequences. Based on these 
consequences, it is questionable whether income support programs provide a net benefit 
to the agricultural environment.  
 
Compete with Subsidizing Countries and Large Agribusinesses 
 
A final justification offered for farm subsidies relates to the ability of U.S. farmers to 
compete with large domestic agribusinesses and subsidized foreign farmers. In terms of 
the domestic agribusiness justification, the basic argument is that given the market 
structure of general commodity production, farmers are pinched between a few large 
input suppliers and a few large commodity purchasers. In other words, large input 
suppliers have the advantage of market power on the cost side of farming while large 
grain and livestock processing companies have the advantage of market power on the 
revenue side of farming. Consequently, the “typical” farmer has little to no market power.  
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Another reason given for the need for farm subsidies is to compete with other countries 
that subsidize their producers. Ultimately these subsidies would reduce world prices, 
causing the prices U.S. farmers receive to drop as well. Subsidies are then needed in the 
U.S. to make up for the lower prices farmers are receiving.  Another reason given for 
U.S. subsidies is that U.S. producers are priced out of foreign markets by export 
subsidies, price support programs, and/or import restrictions enacted by other countries. 
 
Agribusiness Competition    
 
As previously mentioned, large agribusinesses are frequently accused of exercising 
market power to the detriment of small farmers. Given this accusation, two relevant 
questions come to mind. First, is there evidence that large agribusinesses routinely 
exercise market power at the expense of small farmers? Second, if market power is 
exercised, does it warrant subsidies to U.S. farmers. 
 
A number of economic studies have been conducted over the last couple of decades to 
determine whether large agribusinesses systematically exert market power against U.S. 
farmers. A summary of these studies is discussed in Tweeten and Thompson (p. 128-
138). The general conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is that agribusiness 
markets “are imperfectly competitive, but cost efficiencies resulting from greater 
concentration exceed losses from market power distortions” (p.142). More specifically, 
U.S. farmers are not hurt by the application of market power of agribusinesses, and 
consumers gain from lower costs brought forth from economies of scale. Actually, the 
concentration of agribusinesses on the input supply side of farming may benefit farmers 
through gains in research and development and production efficiencies that would not be 
possible if production were diffused among more numerous, smaller companies. 
Likewise, farmers may also benefit from advertising campaigns used by large processing 
and retail agribusinesses that increase the demand for food. Therefore, the strongest 
conclusion that may be drawn from this discussion is that justifying farm programs on the 
basis of competition with large agribusinesses is, at best, a weak argument.   
 
Foreign Subsidies and Trade Barriers 
 
Trade between countries occurs when it is mutually beneficial to the buyer (importer) and 
seller (exporter).  After instituting protectionist trade policies in the 1930s, U.S. 
agricultural exports did not recover their share of farm marketings until the late 1970s 
(Pasour p. 160). In recent years, exports have been crucial to many agricultural 
commodities.  
 
Compared to the high level of agricultural exports in the early 1980s, exports as a share 
of production have risen for some commodities and fallen for others. Whether exports as 
a share of production have risen or fallen over the last two decades, they are very 
important for many commodities in the U.S. For example, nearly 47% of food grains and 
57% of cotton/tobacco were exported in 2002 (USDA, 2003). Obviously, exports are 
critical to U.S. agriculture. So policies, both domestic and foreign, that are conducive to 
trade are generally beneficial to U.S. farmers. However, global trade is extremely 
complex as it is influenced by many factors outside the control of the interested 
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participants. These factors include macroeconomic issues such as exchange and interest 
rates, other trade policies, such as trade barriers on other products or commodities, and 
foreign policy actions. Because of the impact that these factors may have on U.S. farms, 
producers call for farm subsidies. 
 
The relevant question then becomes: Do farm subsidies benefit U.S. farmers in light of 
other countries’ subsidies and protectionism? Because trade is complex, the answer to the 
posed question is complex. Certainly, farmers in the U.S. are affected by the farm and 
trade policies of other countries. A typical result of those actions is to lower the price that 
U.S. farmers receive for their goods—whether those actions are by subsidies or trade 
barriers. A typical response in the U.S. is to institute subsidies or trade barriers. That 
response has economic implications as well.  
 
If the U.S. implements price supports or import restrictions, U.S. producers will likely 
experience higher prices. But those higher prices will have implications beyond what the 
producer will receive. First, higher U.S. prices cost U.S. consumers of those products—a 
fact that is often overlooked and contrary to the “cheap food supply” justification of farm 
subsidies. That additional cost will also reduce the quantity demanded by U.S. 
consumers, putting downward pressure on U.S. domestic prices. Second, U.S. actions 
will affect our ability to export. To the extent that the U.S. institutes price support or 
pseudo price support (i.e. marketing loan) programs that ultimately result in increased 
production and reduced market prices, it can be expected that exporting countries 
affected U.S. actions will respond with subsidies or protectionist measures of their own.  
 
Although it may be known that subsidies or trade barriers may be harmful to the overall 
economy, it may not be politically expedient to stand by while a domestic industry 
suffers because of the actions of another country. This is why trade negotiations are so 
difficult. A recent report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) estimated that $44 billion in welfare gains would be generated if 
subsidies and trade barriers throughout the world were halved. Another study by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimates that there would be $200 
billion in income gains in the global economy if trade was fully liberalized (Bouet, et al.). 
Those who had the highest support and protection would gain the most from the reforms. 
However, local political interests often outweigh larger economic benefits, (as evidenced 
by the recent suspended WTO trade negotiations) making reductions in subsidies and 
trade barriers difficult to achieve. 
 
Summary 
  
This paper discusses five of the most common economic justifications for farm subsidies.  
When analyzed in depth, those justifications are not always as valid as they may seem at 
first. Certainly, there are challenges facing U.S. farmers. Problems of variability of 
income are real to many farmers and rural communities. From the 1930s onward, the 
reaction of the U.S. government to these challenges has been to subsidize selected farm 
commodities. Those subsidies, however, often have unintended consequences that 
mitigate their intended purposes. Likewise, as time goes by, programs can become 
outdated and ineffective. So while the goal of farm subsidies may be noble, their actual 
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effect may be limited. Therefore, the question rising out of this discussion may not be, 
Should we eliminate farm subsidies? Rather, the question may be, Are there farm policy 
options that would better serve U.S. agriculture, taxpayers, and consumers? 
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In the policy world of options and consequences, one option is always to maintain the status quo. For
federal farm programs, that implies re-authorizing or extending the basic three-part farm income safety net
established in the 2002 Farm Bill.
Three-Part Safety Net Program
 That safety net includes marketing assistance loans, direct payments, and counter-cyclical payments that
work together in an integrated net to provide protection based on a target price level for the various
program commodities. The original rates implemented in the 2002 Farm Bill are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Loan Rates, Direct Payment Rates, and Target Prices for Covered Commodities
Loan Rates Direct (Fixed) Payment
Rates
Target Prices
2002-
2003
2004-
2007
2002-2007 2002-
2003
2004-
2007
Corn (bu) $1.98 $1.95 $0.28 $2.60 $2.63
Sorghum (bu) $1.98 $1.95 $0.35 $2.54 $2.57
Barley (bu) $1.88 $1.85 $0.24 $2.21 $2.24
Oats (bu) $1.35 $1.33 $0.024 $1.40 $1.44
Wheat (bu) $2.80 $2.75 $0.52 $3.86 $3.92
Soybeans (bu) $5.00 $5.00 $0.44 $5.80 $5.80
Minor oilseeds (lb) $0.0960 $0.0930 $0.0080 $0.0980 $0.1010
Rice (cwt) $6.50 $6.50 $2.35 $10.50 $10.50
Upland cotton (lb) $0.5200 $0.5200 $0.0667 $0.7240 $0.7240
Peanuts (ton) $355.00 $355.00 $36.00 $495.00 $495.00
The three-part safety net starts with the marketing assistance loan program, which provides income
support based on the national average loan rates as listed in Table 1 for each program commodity. This
support comes as loan proceeds in the amount of the loan rate for each unit of commodity pledged under
the loan program. The loan program has changed over the years to become a marketing loan, meaning
that the program allows for the loan to be repaid by the producer at a rate based on the market price. If
market prices are below the loan rate, the loan can be repaid at the lower of the posted county price,
which reflects the local market prices, or the loan rate plus interest. When the loan is repaid at a posted
county price below the loan rate, the difference between the loan rate and the repayment rate is called a
marketing loan gain (MLG) and represents a benefit to the producer. Alternatively, a producer can request
a loan deficiency payment (LDP) in lieu of a loan. The LDP is equal to the same difference between the
loan rate and the relevant posted county price. The marketing loan program benefits in the form of MLGs
or LDPs are subject to a $75,000 per person payment limit or a $150,000 limit under the three-entity rule
with current farm program rules, although other features of the marketing loan program allow for loan
repayment with certificates or through forfeitures that effectively preclude the impact of these payment
limits for most producers.
2The direct payment is the second part of the current safety net. It first appeared in the 1996 Farm Bill and
guarantees a fixed payment to producers based on the producer’s base acreage and program yield history
multiplied by a fixed payment rate and then multiplied by 85 percent. The direct payment insures a
payment to producers regardless of production or market price and also allows producers almost unlimited
flexibility to grow any crop, except for fruits and vegetables, on the direct payment acre. Direct payments
are subject to a $40,000 per person payment limit, or $80,000 under the full effect of the three-entity rule.
Counter-cyclical payments are the third part of the safety net established in the 2002 Farm Bill. They
provide a payment based on the difference between the target price as listed in Table 1 and the effective
market price for the commodity. That rate is then multiplied by the producer’s based acreage and program
yield history multiplied by 85 percent. The effective market price is equal to the direct payment rate plus
the higher of the marketing loan rate or the actual national average market price. Counter-cyclical
payments are subject to a $65,000 per person payment limit, or $135,000 under the full effect of the three-
entity rule.
2007 Farm Bill Proposals
There have been several calls for maintaining the basic elements of the 2002 Farm Bill in the new
legislation. In USDA’s farm bill proposals released in late January, the basic structure of the three-part
safety net was retained, although the counter-cyclical payment would shift from a price-based payment to
a revenue-based payment. USDA also proposed some adjustments in the basic rates of the marketing
loan and direct payments as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. USDA Farm Bill Recommendations for Marketing Loan Rates and Direct Payments
Loan Rates Direct (Fixed) Payment Rates
Current Average of
Proposed
Rates,
2008-2012
Proposed
Maximum
Current Proposed
2008-2009,
2013-17
Proposed
2010-2012
Corn (bu) $1.95 $1.89 $1.89 $0.28 $0.28 $0.30
Sorghum (bu) $1.95 $1.89 $1.89 $0.35 $0.35 $0.37
Barley (bu) $1.85 $1.70 $1.70 $0.24 $0.25 $0.26
Oats (bu) $1.33 $1.21 $1.21 $0.02 $0.02 $0.03
Wheat (bu) $2.75 $2.58 $2.58 $0.52 $0.52 $0.56
Soybeans (bu) $5.00 $4.92 $4.92 $0.44 $0.47 $0.50
Minor oilseeds
(lb)
$0.0930 $0.0870 $0.0870 $0.0080 $0.0080 $0.00857
Rice (cwt) $6.50 $6.50 $6.50 $2.35 $2.35 $2.52
Upland cotton (lb) $0.5200 $0.4570 $0.5192 $0.0667 $0.1108 $0.1108
Peanuts (ton) $355.00 $336.00 $336.00 $36.00 $36.00 $38.61
 
USDA specifically proposes to establish the marketing loan rates at 85 percent of the five-year Olympic
average market price (eliminating the high and low years), subject to a maximum loan rate as established
in the U.S. House of Representatives version of the 2002 Farm Bill. The change in maximum rates would
mean lower loan rates for most commodities, particularly for upland cotton. USDA also proposes direct
payments that are predominantly in keeping with the existing direct payment rates for the first two years of
the new farm bill before increasing slightly over the last three years of a presumed five-year farm bill
before reverting to the former rates at the end of the next farm bill.
USDA also proposes some modifications in the mechanics of the current safety net programs. Most
significantly, the posted county price for loan repayment would shift from a daily calculation to a monthly
3calculation and the posted county price for purposes of the LDP would apply to the day beneficial interest
is lost, removing the flexibility to establish the LDP or loan repayment rate separately from the time of cash
marketing.
The marketing loan program and the direct payments as proposed by USDA represent only part of the
proposed safety net. The third leg of USDA’s proposal shifts the counter-cyclical payment based on price
to one based on revenue as discussed in the revenue safety net paper.
Several other groups have offered support for the existing safety net. The National Association of Wheat
Growers and the American Soybean Association have both offered formal recommendations to retain the
basic elements of the existing safety net. The wheat growers have argued for increases in direct payments
and target prices and the soybean growers have proposed higher loan rates and target prices.
Five-Part Safety Net Issues
While the existing farm legislation focuses on the existing three-part safety net from the 2002 Farm Bill,
the debate encompasses a much larger discussion of several programs that represent a mix of price,
production, and revenue tools. On top of the three-part safety net, producers have also benefitted from
insurance programs that have become more innovative and more attractive in terms of protection and
premium subsidies. And, producers have often seen and expected disaster assistance in recent years,
even though it is neither formally authorized nor budgeted. In a recent nationwide survey conducted at the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln in conjunction with 26 other states, thousands of agricultural producers
were queried on their policy preferences heading into the new farm bill (for more information on the
survey, see the national report on the web at www.farmfoundation.org or at
www.agecon.unl.edu/pub/2007farmbill.pdf). In response to a question about existing program priorities,
producers ranked several programs on a scale of 1 (least important) to 5 (most important). The results,
broken down by the size group of the producer respondents, show this broad support for the basic farm
income safety net (Figure 1).
Among existing programs that provide
farm payments, producers ranked
disaster assistance as the highest
priority (circled in the graph in Figure 1).
While this ranking may reflect the
survey having been conducted in a time
period during which Congress was
considering potential disaster
assistance, it is indicative of the priority
producers put on existing programs of
farm income support. Furthermore, the
label “5-part safety net” points to the
rankings of the medium- and large-
scale producer segments, both of
whom put disaster assistance,
insurance, and the existing “three-part”
safety net” above all other priorities,
including the range of conservation programs from land retirement (such as CRP and WRP) to working
lands programs (such as EQIP and CSP) to preservation programs. These two segments of commercial-
size agricultural producers clearly place the safety net as a high priority in the farm bill debate.
Related Issues
Beyond the basic structure of the commodity programs and the farm income safety net, there are some
policy issues that will be addressed in any re-authorization of the status quo. Three issues likely to be
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Figure 1. Existing Program Funding Priorities
4discussed as potential adjustments to the status quo include payment limits, fruit and vegetable planting
restrictions, and permanent authority for disaster assistance.
Payment limits have been a topic of debate for some time and are likely to again be part of the primary
debate on the farm bill. Current payment limit rules set individual payment limits per person at $40,000 for
DPs, $65,000 for CCPs, and $75,000 for ML/LDP benefits. In addition, a person can qualify for full
payments in one entity, plus up to half the payments in a second and third entity. This three-entity rule
means that the individual combined limit of $180,000 could equal up to $360,000 per person, if all
individual categories are maximized. In addition, the marketing loan program includes language allowing
repayment of commodity loans with certificates such that the loan gains would not count against the limit.
All three of these issues - the individual payment limits, the three-entity rule, and the unlimited certificate
loan gains - are likely to be debated.
Potential changes could lower the overall limits and reduce payments to some program participants,
theoretically reducing program spending. USDA’s proposed farm bill recommendations would attribute
payments directly to individuals, eliminate the three-entity rule, and make modifications to the overall
payment limits for each part of the program. More significantly, USDA proposes a change in the program
eligibility rules for adjusted gross income. The current eligibility rules state that to be eligible for farm
programs, individuals must have an average adjusted gross income of $2.5 million or less or have at least
75 percent of the adjusted gross income from agricultural activities. The proposed rules would shift the cap
to $200,000 and eliminate the 75-percent exclusion.
Alternatively, such changes may push producers to simply adjust their business structure to legally comply
with any changed rules without leaving potential program payments unclaimed. Regardless of any
changes, this issue will likely continue to be a primary focal point for debate.
The fruit and vegetable planting restriction is also due to be addressed within the scope of existing
commodity programs and could particularly impact dry bean producers in Nebraska and other Great Plains
regions. Under current program rules, producers cannot enroll in the DP and CCP program and also plant
fruits and vegetables on the enrolled acreage. This planting restriction dates back several years. As
producers were given more flexibility to make cropping decisions without giving up program payments, this
restriction prevented them from shifting acres to fruit and vegetable production and directly competing with
specialty crop growers who did not received direct crop support payments. The planting restriction became
an issue in the WTO cotton case filed against the United States by Brazil. Since the planting restriction
was interpreted to be affecting production decisions, the DPs, which were thought to be decoupled from
production and thus, trade-legal, were found to not be fully decoupled and thus counted against U.S.
spending limits.
In the aftermath of the WTO dispute, it has been widely expected that the restriction would be removed to
eliminate the trade impact. However, that brings the fruit and vegetable industry to the table with major
concerns over farm programs and spending. If the planting restriction disappears, the specialty crop sector
has argued that they need part of the farm program spending pie. They have also argued that the value of
fruit, vegetable, and other specialty crop production is fully half of the nation’s value of crop production in
2006 (USDA-ERS) and thus, are deserving of program support in the billions of dollars on par with
program commodities, perhaps as much as 50 percent, or $4.7 billion of the estimated $9.4 billion in
spending on direct and counter-cyclical payments to program crop producers in 2006 (USDA-ERS).
Conversely, the potential economic impact on fruit and vegetable growers of eliminating the planting
restriction might be estimated by the value of government payments a producer would have to give up to
make the switch in production. Using the $9.4 billion estimate from 2006 spread over approximately 350
million crop acres enrolled in the federal farm program (USDA-FSA), the average government payment
was approximately $27 per program base acre. If that amount were budgeted over the approximately 12
million acres nationwide of fruits, vegetables, dry beans, and potatoes (2002 Census of Agriculture), the
equivalent annual payments might amount to $324 million. It is clear that the political question of what to
5do with fruits and vegetables is far from decided. The simple calculations above potentially put boundaries
on the debate, but the range of just over $300 million to more than $4 billion is hardly concise. USDA’s
proposed farm bill recommendations include the elimination of the planting restriction and the proposed
addition of more than $500 million per year for fruit, vegetable, and specialty crop programs on market
development, food program purchases, and production research.
Finally, the role of agricultural disaster assistance, its regular implementation over the past several years,
and its political support among producers have led to some calls to make it permanent. Currently, disaster
assistance has been ad hoc authority developed by Congress to address production and/or economic
losses in agriculture from year to year. In regularly passing some form of assistance on an ad hoc basis,
Congress is often challenged to declare it emergency spending or to find funding by cutting spending in
other areas. The two recent disaster assistance packages passed in 2003 for 2001 and 2002 losses and
in 2004 for 2003 and 2004 losses both were funded in part by cutting spending projections for
conservation programs. This continual fight for funding is part of the reason any potential assistance for
losses from the 2005 crop year is still unresolved. Making disaster assistance permanent would simply
add the authority for the program to be carried out each year as needed. Of course, making it permanent
would also add several billion in expected spending levels to the farm program at a time when budget,
trade, and political constraints may not allow it.
1Sugar and Dry Beans
Paul A. Burgener
University of Nebraska
Panhandle Research and Extension Center
Scottsbluff, Nebraska
In the Nebraska Panhandle, two key crops are sugarbeets and dry edible beans. Rotations in western
Nebraska depend on these crops because neither soybeans nor grain sorghum are economically viable in
the region. In addition, a significant infrastructure related to these crops has been developed over the past
one hundred plus years. Both of these crops generate as much economic activity from processing as they
do in farm level crop revenue. These are truly value added agriculture opportunities for the region. Grower
owned cooperatives process all of the sugarbeets, and a portion of the dry beans in the area, giving the
producers another potential income stream as these crops move through market channels.
Neither sugarbeets nor dry beans are considered commodity crops in the traditional sense when farm bill
discussions begin. Although the crops have far different farm program ties, neither of them is included in
any type of direct payment or marketing loan program. Dry beans rely on the Fruit and Vegetable Planting
Restriction (FAV), while the sugar industry relies on a complex combination of tariff-rate import quotas,
domestic marketing allotments, and price supports designed to control supply and maintain price while
avoiding cash payments to growers.
Sugar
The sugar industry has been supported by some form of policy since the Sugar Act of 1934 was passed
requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to balance domestic use with domestic production and imports by
assigning each producer and importer a quota. This program stayed in place for forty years, until 1974
when high sugar prices caused Congress not to renew the legislation. 
As surplus sugar was becoming burdensome, and sugar prices had dropped, the Food and Agriculture Act
of 1977 placed supports back onto the domestic sugar crop in the form of purchases and loans, while
using import duties and fees to maintain domestic prices. 
Sugar policy as we know it actually originated in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1981 when a nonrecourse
loan program was developed to protect sugar prices and production in the domestic market. In addition, a
sugar import quota system was developed in May of 1982 to keep imported sugar from depressing prices
below a level that would entice processors to forfeit sugar to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) as
sugar went below the loan rate. In 1990, these quotas were changed to a tariff-rate quota system due to a
GATT challenge to the original quota system. In 1985, a provision was included to require administrators
to manage sugar policy such that there would be no cost to the treasury from the forfeiture of sugar to the
CCC of sugar placed into the loan program. In 1996, the no-cost provision was dropped from the
legislation, and it returned in 2002. What this has done is place production under domestic marketing
allocations to control production and hold price above the loan rate.
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 has continued our history of price supports for sugar
at “no-net cost” to the Federal Budget. This is still done with tariff-rate quotas to control imports and
marketing allotments for domestic sugar companies limiting the amount of sugar that they can market in a
year to a level that keeps the price high enough to avoid forfeiture of nonrecourse sugar under the loan
program to the CCC.
The NAFTA agreement with Mexico will open the United States borders for additional non-tariff sugar
beginning in 2008. Under this scenario, the Secretary of Agriculture would be required under 2002 farm bill
2provision to suspend marketing allotments when projected sugar imports exceed 1.532 million short tons.
Previously, the expectation that imports would exceed 1.532 million short tons would suggest that there
was a production shortfall in the U.S., bringing with it higher prices and interest in increasing production,
thus the suspension of marketing allotments. As Mexico gains access to U.S. markets, and expected
imports will exceed the threshold, all of the rules will have changed. Now imports may be too high,
because of excess imports from Mexico, and not because U.S. production is low. Suspending marketing
allotments under this scenario would further depress market prices, and encourage forfeiture of sugar to
the CCC. The current recommendation is to remove the provision to suspend marketing allotments when
prospective imports are above the 1.532 million short ton limit, allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to
further reduce domestic production in an effort to maintain prices above the loan rate and continue to run
the sugar program at “no-net cost.” 
Sugar policy is always “at risk” in international trade negotiations, because of its inherent trade distorting
provisions. Because of this, one can always assume that the life expectancy of the current policy is
tenuous at best. Sugar producers have begun to consider the idea of stepping into the same line as other
commodity producers and asking for a direct payment based on historical planted acres. Because the
present sugar policy lives by the “no-net cost” battle cry, the idea of direct payments has not garnered
much support at the present time.
Dry Beans
Dry beans have been a part of the Fruit and Vegetable (FAV) provisions under existing legislation and are
continuing to use that designation for political strength. The U.S. fruit and vegetable industry is 20 percent
of U.S. agriculture exports and 33 percent of value of production at the farm gate. At the same time, these
crops were produced on 13 million acres, or approximately 3 percent of the U.S. farm land. This sector
includes over 100 separate commodities from tree fruits to potatoes to melons to dry beans. With this
diversity, one can imagine the difficulty in development of policy that pleases all of these growers. 
Fruit and vegetable growers have not been concerned with farm program provisions through most of our
farm support history. These are traditionally higher value crops and usually difficult to enter and exit as
prices rise and fall. Historically, commodity crops such as, wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, etc. have been
required to be grown on base acres under the program provisions. In 1990, planting flexibility was included
in the farm bill. With planting flexibility, producers could plant most anything they wanted on program acres
and still receive payments based on historical commodity acres. The fruit and vegetable growers were
successful in getting a provision inserted into the language that limited the planting of fruits and vegetables
to non base acres. In other words, if the land had corn or wheat history, a grower cannot plant fruits or
vegetables on those base acres. If my farm is 500 acres and I have 400 acres of corn base that I receive
payments on, I am only allowed to plant 100 acres of something considered to be a fruit or vegetable
without receiving some type of penalty in terms of reduced government payments.
This program allowed fruit and vegetable growers some ability to control the number of acres planted to
these crops, while not participating directly in the farm program payment system. The 2002 farm bill
continued with decoupled direct payments that were considered to be “green box” or minimally trade
distorting and thus not subject to limitations. Included in the 2002 legislation is the FAV provision limiting
fruits and vegetables on base acres. In March 2005, the WTO ruled that the U.S. direct payments for
cotton do not meet the definition of decoupled because of the restriction of planting fruits and vegetables
on those acres. By default, this places the direct payments for all commodities under question. If the FAV
provision is lost, production of fruits and vegetables will be possible on all base acres without restriction.
The fruit and vegetable industry has asked fro something to offset this loss in the 2007 farm bill. Most of
the industry realizes that there are significant barriers to entry for most FAV restricted crops. There are
labor constraints, agronomic concerns, specialized equipment, and many other crop production issues that
make it difficult to get into most of these crops with ease. These growers have asked for assistance in the
trade title, the conservation title, the nutrition title, the research title, and in the rural development title. The
3majority of producers do not want a direct payment to replace the present FAV provision, but would like to
be represented in the farm bill under these other titles.
In the dry bean industry, there is concern that the crop will be planted by producers on acres that have no
history, but do have significant direct payments. It is believed that the potential advantage that these
producers will have over traditional dry bean growers will range between $27 per acre to $41 per acre. For
crops like dry beans, there are few barriers to entry. Producers with typical soybean equipment and
complimentary climate conditions can get into dry bean production at little cost with limited risk. If these
producers enter the dry bean market, it is believed that they will have nearly a $2 per cwt advantage in the
market. This equates to somewhere between 15 and 30 percent. Although dry bean producers are
interested in the trade, conservation, research, and other provisions, they believe that the direct payment
of $27 to $41 per acre will be needed to level the playing field. 
For both sugarbeet and dry bean producers, the farm bill discussion has a different view than it does for
the typical Nebraska producer. In the Panhandle, many of the irrigated producers are both sugarbeet and
dry bean growers bringing a double shot of concern to these issues.
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Leading up to the 2002 Farm Bill, much debate centered on the need to provide an 
enhanced safety net for crop producers when prices decreased. Crop producers received 
direct payments and marketing loan program payments averaging nearly $10 billion per 
year from 1999-2001, but that was deemed insufficient, and Congress intervened to 
provide a total of $19.5 billion in market loss assistance (MLA) payments over those 
three years. However, instead of having to ask Congress for ad hoc assistance every year, 
farm groups petitioned their representatives to formalize the MLA payments into a 
permanent program. As a result, the counter-cyclical payment (CCP) program was 
created. This program makes payments to farmers on historical production when the 
average U.S. market price falls below the effective target price for that commodity. 
Through 2006, an estimated $9.6 billion has been paid out through the CCP program. 
 
With two of the three commodity safety net programs tied to price, it is fair to say that 
producers of commodity program crops should be well covered in low price 
environments. But does that imply that the safety net is now sufficient? Given the fact 
that an average of $1.3 billion in crop disaster aid has been paid out annually from 1999-
2006 suggests that the current combination of safety net programs is not sufficient. The 
primary problem with safety net programs that are tied to price is that they are not very 
effective in high price/low yield environments. Consider wheat for example. The wheat 
yield in Kansas in 2002 averaged 33 bushels per acre, which was significantly below 
record yields in recent years. Because of the low production in Kansas and other regions 
of the U.S., the market year average price rose from $2.72/bushel in 2001 to $3.41/bushel 
in 2002. Because the market price was above levels that triggered counter-cyclical 
payments or loan deficiency payments (LDPs), no payments were made. The lack of 
CCPs and LDPs was one of the reasons net farm income in the U.S. was lower in 2002 
than any other over the last ten years. Similar circumstances also occurred in 2006.  
 
Economically, there is a strong argument for a redesigned safety net that more effectively 
focuses on a bottom line revenue or net farm income goal instead of the current multitude 
of safety net tools that variously focus on price, production, or some mix of the two. The 
previous example demonstrates that the current mix of safety net programs have some 
holes. As the 2007 Farm Bill proposal from the Bush Administration states: 
 
“By failing to take into account actual production per acre, current counter-
cyclical payments tend to under-compensate producers when yields decline and 
over-compensate producers when yields increase.” 
 
As a result, several proposals have been made to convert the counter-cyclical payment 
program from one that triggers payments based on price to one that triggers payments 
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based on revenue. Following is a discussion of three counter-cyclical revenue proposals. 
These include proposals from USDA, the National Corn Growers Association (NCGA), 
and American Farmland Trust (AFT), which was developed by Carl Zulauf, an 
agricultural economist at Ohio State University. 
 
USDA Revenue-Based Counter-Cyclical Payment Program 
 
The proposed revenue-based counter-cyclical payment program from USDA works in the 
following manner. Payments would be triggered when actual national revenue per acre 
falls below the national target revenue per acre. The national target revenue is calculated 
by multiplying the national average yield of each program commodity for 2002-2006 
(excluding the high and low years) by the effective target price for the commodity. The 
effective target price equals the CCP target price from the 2002 farm bill minus the direct 
payment rate. The actual national revenue per acre is calculated by multiplying the 
national average yield for the commodity times the higher of: (1) the season-average 
market price and (2) the loan rate for the commodity. 
 
If the actual national revenue is below the national target revenue, according to the 
USDA proposal, “the national revenue-based payment per acre would be converted to a 
payment rate for producers by dividing the national revenue payment per acre by the U.S. 
average payment yield per base acre under the 2002 farm bill countercyclical payment 
program.” The total payment to a producer would equal the national average payment 
rate for the commodity times the producer’s base acres times the producer’s 2002 CCP 
program payment yield times 85 percent.  
 
According to the USDA proposal, “base acres and program payment yields would remain 
fixed over the life of the 2007 farm bill.” In addition, “the national yield for determining 
target revenue would remain fixed over the life of the 2007 farm bill.” Table 1 provides 
an example of how payments would be calculated in two scenarios for corn.    
 
Table 1. Example Calculations of USDA Proposed Revenue-Based Counter-Cyclical 
Program for Corn 
 Corn Scenario #1 
Actual Price=$2.00/bu. 
Actual Yield=170.0/bu. 
Corn Scenario #2 
Actual Price=$2.30/bu. 
Actual Yield=130.0/ac. 
Target Price $2.63/bu. $2.63/bu. 
Direct Payment $0.28/bu. $0.28/bu. 
Effective Target Price $2.35/bu. $2.35/bu. 
Olympic Avg Yield (2002-06) 146.4 bu./ac. 146.4 bu./ac. 
Target Revenue (a) $344.04 $344.04 
Actual Revenue (b) $340.00 $299.00 
Payment Per Acre (a-b) $4.04 $45.04 
Program Yield (c)  114.3 bu./ac. 114.3 bu./ac. 
Payment Rate Per Bushel  
(a-b / c) $0.035 $0.394 
 
 3
 
National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) Revenue-Based Safety Net Proposal 
 
In October, 2006 the Public Policy Action Team of NCGA proposed a plan that would 
trigger payments based on declines in revenue instead of price. In addition to maintaining 
direct payments like the USDA proposal, the NCGA plan proposes two programs that are 
revenue-based. The first program guarantees farm level revenue and is referred to as Base 
Revenue Protection (BRP). The second program guarantees revenue at the county level 
and is referred to as the Revenue Counter Cyclical Program (RCCP).  
 
Similar to Revenue Assurance (RA), BRP provides a guarantee of 70 percent of the five-
year Olympic average crop net revenue for a farm. That revenue guarantee is calculated 
annually by multiplying the farm crop yield times the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS) price minus the Economic Research Service (ERS) estimated variable 
cost for the crop. Payments would be made if the farm revenue fell more than 30 percent 
below the Olympic average net revenue. 
 
RCCP guarantees gross revenue at the county level, similar to the Group Risk Insurance 
Program (GRIP). With this program, the revenue guarantee is calculated by multiplying 
the effective target price from the CCP program in the 2002 farm bill times the calculated 
county-level trend yield. A payment is made when the average county yield times the 
average national price is below the revenue guarantee. However, the RCCP payment is 
limited to 30% of the revenue guarantee. 
 
American Farmland Trust (AFT) Integrated Farm Revenue Program 
 
The Integrated Farm Revenue Program (IFRP) is similar to the USDA proposal in that 
payments are triggered when national income falls below the predetermined target 
revenue. However, the mechanics of IFRP is different than the USDA proposal. For 
example, in the IFRP proposal, the target revenue is calculated by multiplying the 
expected U.S. yield per acre times the expected price of the crop. The realized or actual 
revenue is calculated by multiplying the actual U.S. average yield times the U.S. average 
harvest price of the crop. If the actual revenue is less than the target revenue, then a 
deficiency payment will be made to make up the difference. The payment for an 
individual farm would be based on the expected farm revenue (APH yield x Futures 
based harvest price) times the national percent revenue loss (revenue deficiency payment 
/ national expected revenue). The IFRP payment would then be subtracted from any 
individual insurance payment made to a farmer.  
 
Summary  
 
All three of the revenue-based proposals are designed to achieve the same goal, but use 
different means to do so. Two of the proposals (USDA and AFT) trigger payments when 
national revenue falls below the target level. The other proposal (NCGA) triggers 
payments when county and individual farm revenue falls below the target level. Since the 
proposals use different methods to calculate the revenue target and payment when 
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revenue falls below that target, they will vary in how much money will be distributed 
through them and to whom it will be distributed. As with virtually any government 
program that intervenes in the marketplace, there will likely be unintended consequences. 
Inherent with these different designs are several possible economic and political 
difficulties. First, to the extent that a new proposed revenue safety net mimics an existing 
insurance product, it would effectively eliminate the market for the insurance policy, 
creating duplication between the USDA Farm Service Agency and the private, but 
publically subsidized insurance market. Second, the design of some programs could favor 
some commodities over others. Likewise, some regions of the county could benefit over 
others. Third, it is still questionable how much support these programs would offer verses 
current safety net programs. Therefore, it is important that these proposals are thoroughly 
evaluated before any are passed into law.  
 
 
Additional information on the revenue proposals is available at: 
 
American Farmland Trust Integrated Farm Revenue Program (www.farmland.org) 
 
National Corn Growers Association Revenue Program (www.ncga.com) 
 
USDA Counter-Cyclical Revenue Program (www.usda.gov) 
 
 
  
1The 2007 Farm Bill: Green Programs and Conservation
Bradley D. Lubben
Extension Public Policy Specialist
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Green programs, or farm payments for non-commodity production reasons, has been an attractive goal to
many groups for several years. Conservation groups have lobbied for some time for farm payments to be
tied to conservation practices instead of production. In fact, there has been substantial growth in
conservation spending for many programs over the past two decades (see Figure 1). Total conservation
spending has grown from just a
few hundred million dollars per
year through the early 1980s to
nearly $3 billion per year by
2006. While the support and
scope of conservation
programs has clearly grown,
there is substantial interest in
how much more conservation
program might grow in the
future. In analyzing
conservation programs, it is
convenient to focus on the
categories of land retirement
programs, working lands
programs, and land
preservation programs.
Land Retirement Programs
In the category of land
retirement, the two biggest
programs include the
Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) and the Wetlands
Reserve Program (WRP) that
take land out of production
temporarily or permanently.
These programs, particularly
the CRP, have been the major
thrust of conservation program
spending in the last 20 years.
The CRP currently has 37
million acres (see Figure 2)
enrolled with a cap of 39 million
acres. These contracts earn
annual payments of $1.8
billion, representing nearly two-
thirds of all conservation
payments in the United States.
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Figure 1. Conservation Program Payments (USDA-ERS)
Figure 2. Cumulative CRP Enrollment as of Fiscal Year 2005 (USDA-FSA)
2There are several issues relative to the CRP, including future enrollment levels and priorities and the
future of existing CRP acres nearing expiration. Historically, CRP acres have been concentrated in the
Great Plains region from Texas to North Dakota (see Figure 2). Many of those acres originally entered the
CRP in the late 1980s at a time when the CRP was focused on enrolling crop production acres and
reducing the planted acreage as a tool of supply control. While many of the same acres were renewed in
the late 1990s, they are now nearing expiration at a time when the future of the CRP is more uncertain.
Recent CRP enrollments have focused more on continuous high-priority lands and conservation practices
than the earlier general enrollments did. As such, acres expiring now and in the future may have a more
difficult time being rebid into the CRP competitively against newer higher-priority acres across the United
States.
This question of acres nearing expiration became particularly relevant in the current farm bill debate
because more than 28 million acres, or more than three-fourths of total CRP enrollments, are set to expire
in the period 2007-2010. In light of this situation, USDA offered in 2006 a system of automatic renewals or
extensions to CRP contract holders of land expiring in the near term. The proposed extensions/renewals
would potentially smooth out the peak of expiring acres starting in 2007 to a more stable level over the
next several years. The fate of those extension offers remains uncertain at present, in part because the
final approval of new contracts is not yet complete, and in part because the changing economics of higher
grain prices since the initial CRP extension announcement has potentially changed some of the plans.
Now, as opposed to the question of how many acres might be kept in the CRP, the question is how many
acres might come out of the CRP, either at expiration or through the possibility of an early-out option to
return to production. Certainly, the current crop economics would encourage some land to come out of the
CRP and return to crop production, but some cursory USDA analysis suggest no more than a few million
acres could economically return to cropland. The potential for an expanded CRP rests on the efforts to
authorize several million acres in a biomass reserve to build up the production potential pending the
possibility of wide-spread cellulosic ethanol production.
Working Lands Programs
In contrast to the CRP and WRP, the working lands programs provide conservation cost-share and
incentive payments to
producers for practices on land
and operations that are in
production. Payments through
the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) or
the Conservation Security
Program (CSP) help pay for
conservation practices and
provide incentives for
environmental management.
These programs represent the
largest potential growth area in
terms of funding.
The CSP was authorized in the
2002 Farm Bill and was
advertised as a large program
providing payments to
producers for continued good
conservation practices and
additional payments for even
better practices. However, the
Figure 3. Conservation Security Program Watersheds (USDA-NRCS)
3CSP has only received limited funding thus far and has only been implemented in limited watersheds
across the country. Barely 10 percent of the nation’s watersheds have been eligible thus far through the
first three years of the CSP and the watersheds announced for fiscal year 2007 may not actually be
funded. Even in those eligible watersheds, the limited funding has constrained the number of applications
accepted, leaving substantially more funding opportunities ahead.
The EQIP has seen significant funding and growth over the past several years, but it too has dealt with
much more demand than actual funding. Table 1 highlights some of the EQIP funding and sign-up details
in the United States, Kansas, and Nebraska.
Table 1. EQIP Program Participation and Funding, 2002 - 2006
Year
United States Kansas Nebraska
Applica-
tions Contracts
Funds
($ Million)
Applica-
tions Contracts
Funds
($ Million)
Applica-
tions Contracts
Funds
($ Million)
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
90,312
204,313
181,807
82,114
73,823
19,817
30,251
46,413
49,406
41,190
$322.2
$483.5
$718.2
$794.3
$788.0
4,418
8,440
7,408
2,564
2,733
661
731
1,821
2,022
1,666
$11.6
$14.6
$22.2
$24.8
$23.8
9,677
10,056
10,390
3,918
3,443
985
974
1,625
1,751
1,528
$12.1
$13.4
$24.2
$27.0
$25.6
Whether in Kansas, Nebraska, or the United States, the demand for assistance under the EQIP program
has far exceeded available funding. While total funding nationwide had grown to nearly $800 million
annually by 2005 and 2006, more than 40 percent of all applications were not funded. The pent-up
demand in Kansas and Nebraska was even more significant with substantially more than half of all
applications unfunded.
Land Preservation Programs
The third major category of conservation spending is land preservation programs. These include the Farm
and Ranch Land Preservation Program (FRPP) and the Grasslands Reserve Program (GRP) among
others. Payments under these programs often take the form of easements that preserve the land in
agricultural use and prevent it from being converted to other uses. These programs tend to be more
popular and more utilized in those regions facing greater potential of non-farm development, such as in
rapidly developing rural areas on the fringe of metropolitan regions.
Conclusion
Summing up a big option, green programs, whether in conservation or in energy, will certainly be a big
part of the discussion on the new farm bill. Conservation programs are championed by some as the
preferred alternative method of making payments to producers and could draw some spending away from
existing commodity programs.
2007 Farm Bill:  Energy Components 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 Farm Bill may well be a legislative landmark for the future of biofuels and alternative 
energy in the United States.  While the 2002 Farm Bill was the first to include an energy title, the 
2007 version of this premier farm legislation may be the farm bill that people point to when they 
describe how alternative fuels became a central theme for U.S. ag policy.  While the farm bill 
may not wear the moniker of “Renewable Fuels for a Robust America,” it looks as if that title 
may be claim of many. 
 
Examining the prominence of renewable energy based programs in the current farm bill 
proposals and the type of policy alternatives being put forward will provide a venue to build an 
outlook for the future of agriculturally-based biofuels. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Energy is a topic that has been on the minds of many agricultural producers, lawmakers, 
administrators, and agribusiness people – not to mention virtually every national newscast.  
While the prices at the fuel pumps of America have captured widespread attention, farmers and 
ranchers have looked at increased production costs.  Dramatic price increases in energy-intensive 
inputs for the early part of this decade have been the norm.  While many lament those costs, 
some revel in the opportunities. 
 
Ethanol production in the U.S. has increased dramatically since the early 1990’s.  (See Figure 1.  
U.S. Ethanol Production 1990-2006.)  By the end of 2009, projections are for the total capacity 
of U.S. ethanol production to be in excess of 11 billion gallons.  When the expansion of current 
ethanol biorefineries and construction of additional facilities underway are finished we will have 
11.8 billion gallons of capacity. 
 
The current requirements for the utilization of alternative biofuels are well below existing levels 
of production.  While the requirements increase through 2012, the expected capacity of the 
ethanol industry alone is expected to exceed the 2012 level by more than a billion gallons in the 
year 2008. 
 
Biofuels have definitely impacted our economy.  The magnitude of demand for ethanol 
feedstocks is one of the primary drivers to be considered in farm income forecasts.  The climb in 
prices for grains and soybeans during the latter portion of 2006 and into the beginning of 2007 is 
a major agricultural story.  We are facing a time when prices are supported more by the demand 
for products than a shortfall in production. 
 
“In 2006 and 2007 as well, we are seeing a Perfect Storm for Bio-Fuels.” 
--Brent Erickson,  
Executive Vice President of BIO’s Industrial & Environmental Section  
Cellulosic materials – primarily using fibrous materials such as stover, straw, or woody material 
– are the focus of several key legislative proposals.  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 
2005) established a 250 million gallon requirement for renewable fuels produced from cellulosic 
materials to be reached by 2012.  Currently, there is no commercial production of cellulosic 
biofuels in the U.S.1  The technology is available, but not a commercially viable level. 
 
The Broin Companies announced their decision to build the first cellulosic ethanol biorefinery in 
the U.S.  This will involve the conversion of an existing corn-based ethanol plant to a cellulosic 
biorefinery that will utilize corn fiber and stover.  Although it was a large announcement 
indicating the beginning of the process, it could still take a great deal of investment in time and 
money to initiate the commercial production of cellulosic ethanol.  Greater risk may be involved 
in the implementation of an unproven commercial undertaking; great rewards may also be found 
by those who are able to perfect and market the technologies early. 
 
THE “FEEL GOOD” PRINCIPLE 
There are several arguments for targeted increases in biofuels production.  One of the arguments 
with broad appeal is the potential to reduce our use of fossil fuels.  Environmental groups 
sometimes tout the alternative fuel as a friendly measure to replace oil-based petroleum fuels.  
This proposition quickly turns to gaining independence from foreign oil supplies thus fostering 
“energy security.”  The prospects of “energy security” tie well with the guttural reactions to wars 
in the Middle East. 
 
A principle contained in the USDA’s farm bill proposal is that of “reinvigorating rural America.”  
Biorefineries allows for greater opportunities for rural producers to invest in further value-added 
processes utilizing their products.  This not only applies to financial investment portfolios, but 
also can benefit rural areas in other ways.  Biorefineries located near agricultural production 
centers can result in job and wealth creation in rural areas. 
 
The additional demand for feedstocks by biorefineries has shown up as a major price mover in 
grain and oilseed markets.  Not only has the price of corn and soybeans increased from the latter 
end of 2006, but other crops that are substitutes in the livestock feed and biofuels feedstock 
markets have seen price increases.  This in turn has reduced the expected level of direct 
government payments as markets have rewarded those with excess crops to sell. 
 
The Proposals 
The highlighted farm bill proposal now is that recently released by the USDA.  This proposal 
links to energy in several specific titles.  Namely:  Conservation, Rural Development, Research, 
Forestry, and Energy.  The primary emphasis is on the use of cellulosic feedstock for producing 
biofuels.  While the amount of ethanol and other biofuels produced from traditional agricultural 
products such as grains and oilseeds may be limited in their scope to meet the energy needs, the 
use of cellulosic technologies may expand our alternative fuel capacity greatly. 
 
The USDA proposal recognizes that the risks involved in commercializing cellulosic biofuels 
technologies may require favorable policies, shared research funding, and investment incentives 
to bring the new technologies to the public.  Several of the policies in the proposed 2007 Farm 
Bill address these issues.  Specifically: 
                                                 
1 Renewable Fuels Association.  http://www.ethanolrfa.org 
 
Conservation Reserve Program:  Priority would be given within whole-field enrollments for land 
used to produce biomass for energy purposes.  
 
Loans and Grants:  There is a proposed restructuring among federal agencies including the 
USDA Rural Development renewable energy grant and research program under the authority of 
the Biomass Research and Development Act of 2000 (BRDA2000).  Over ten years this would 
include mandatory funding of $500 million for Renewable Energy Systems and Energy 
Efficiency Improvements Grants; and $150 million for the competitive grant program under the 
BRDA200. 
 
The construction of biorefinery projects would also be prioritized for loan and loan guarantee 
programs.  Loan guarantee limits would be expanded to $100 million for cellulosic ethanol 
projects with certain other changes made to enhance the opportunity to obtain guaranteed loans.  
This includes making an investment of $210 million to support $2.17 billion in guaranteed loans 
for the construction of cellulosic ethanol plants. 
 
Research:  $50 million annually over 10 years for a proposed Agricultural Bio-Energy and Bio-
Based Products Research Initiative;  Wood-to-Energy program to invest $150 million over 10 
years to research conversion of low-value woody mass into biofuels. 
 
Feedstock Source Investment:  A direct investment of $25 million annually from 2009 to 2012 
for sourcing biomass feedstock for increased cellulosic ethanol production. 
 
Several other suggestions for restructuring existing programs to increase the use of bio-based 
products with more modest funding proposals are also included in the USDA proposal.   
 
AGRICULTURE AS THE WHOLE 
Whatever happens with bioenergy will surely impact all of agriculture.  Livestock feed prices are 
directly impacted by what happens with the grains markets and we have seen how the demand 
for feedstocks for biorefineries moves those markets.  While expansion of cellulosic ethanol 
production may take some future market share from grain-based biorefineries, the existing 
investment in those plants will certainly maintain a support for grain prices in the near future. 
 
The National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) raised their concerns regarding 
skyrocketing grain prices and the impact on cattle feeders and producers due to grain-based 
ethanol production.  In the February 2007 NCBA resolutions process, there was support voiced 
for the future of the domestic bioenergy industry, but in an area that is not focused solely on 
biorefineries using feed grains.  NCBA is seeking for a sunset of the current ethanol blending tax 
credits and the tariffs on imported ethanol.  The organization is also calling for greater emphasis 
on cellulosic technologies that are less likely to spur on higher grain prices.  Other livestock 
organizations are also considering similar language and concepts in upcoming meetings of their 
policy development groups. 
 
Grain merchandisers, livestock feeders, ranchers, and agribusiness people along with crop 
producers will be looking to the energy policies of the future for their impact on agriculture.  
Marketing strategies and sourcing of inputs will be honed in the future based on the policies that 
are implemented.  Additional research in the utilization of co-products from biorefineries and the 
applications for livestock and other sectors will be necessary. 
 
RELATED LEGISLATIVE AREAS 
The 2007 Farm Bill and the House and Senate Agriculture Committees will not be the only 
legislative centers that impact agriculture’s energy future.  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(EPACT 2005) set the level of renewable fuels mandated at the current time.  (See Figure 2.  
U.S. Renewable Fuels Requirements.)  Any general energy aspect that is desired by agriculture 
for utilization of biofuels will need to be examined by the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce and the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.  Likewise, federal 
tax incentives will need to gain traction in the House Committee on Ways and Means – not to 
mention the entire U.S. Congress and the President. 
 
Some notable policy venues outside the 2007 Farm Bill regarding the future of biofuels are: 
 
President Bush, State of the Union 2007:  Reducing gasoline usage by 20% in ten years; this will 
be accomplished in part by increasing the mandate for alternative and renewable fuels to 35 
billion gallons by 2017.  Importing a portion of the alternative fuels is considered in this plan.  
“Safety valves” for prices of alternative fuels or their inputs would be included.  The proposal 
includes aspects for improved crop yields and alternative technologies, such as cellulosic 
materials conversion. 
 
Senators Harkin, Obama, Lugar, Dorgan, and Biden:  60 billion gallons of ethanol and biodiesel 
blended in motor vehicle fuel annually by 2030.  Various tax credits and mandates on the 
blending of biofuels and distribution are included in this broad based set of policies. 
 
Senators Grassley and Salazar:  “25 x 25”  This is a Senate resolution to establish the goal of 
25% of the U.S. total energy consumption in the year 2025 coming from American farms, 
ranches, and forests.  This proposal does not spell out specific changes to meet the goal, only 
emphasizes that this should be accomplished. 
 
SUMMARY POINTS 
• Energy components of the next farm bill will impact agriculture as a whole, not only crop 
producers. 
• The current market-driven production of biofuels, with existing incentives, is running 
steadily above legislated mandates. 
• The 2007 Farm Bill will likely focus on cellulosic materials for the broadest portion of 
investment and incentives. 
• Funding for research and development is expected to continue for alternative fuels; 
particularly for alternatives such as cellulosic ethanol. 
• The USDA 2007 Farm Bill proposal includes $1.6 billion in new funding for renewable 
energy research, development and production. 
• Such diverse areas as the Conservation Reserve Program will likely be impacted by 
biofuels as alternatives for domestic energy production and use are considered. 
• Any legislative proposal for biofuels that is not solely under the purview of the respective 
House and Senate committees dealing with agriculture will require other committees to 
be involved.  This includes any requirement for biofuels use or tax incentives. 
Figure 1.  U.S. Ethanol Production 1990-2006 
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Source:  Renewable Fuels Association & K-State Research & Extension 
 
Figure 2.  U.S. Renewable Fuels Requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Energy Policy Act of 2005 & K-State Research & Extension 
 
Renewable Fuels Requirements:
Energy Policy Act of 2005
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